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Knoepffler: Confrontation Clause

SOMEONE CALL 911, CRAWFORD IS DYING
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Duhs1
(decided March 29, 2011)

I.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Michael Duhs allegedly placed his girlfriend‟s three-year-old
son into a tub of “scalding hot water” while he babysat the child,
which resulted in second and third degree burns on the child‟s lower
extremities.2 “When the child‟s mother returned home approximately
five hours later, defendant and the mother took the child to the hospital.”3 At Duhs‟ trial for first-degree assault and “endangering the
welfare of a child,”4 the court allowed the emergency room pediatrician to testify about a statement that the child made while no one else
was present under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay
rule.5
The pediatrician testified that she “asked the child why he did
not get out of tub” and that the child responded, in reference to the
defendant, “he wouldn‟t let me out.”6 This statement was not included in the medical records and the child did not testify at trial.7
The pediatrician explained that she observed the child and wanted to
1

947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 618.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (“Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment” are not excluded as hearsay.).
6
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 618.
7
Id.
2

979
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know how he had been injured in order to assess how he should be
treated.8 She stated that by phrasing the question the way that she
did, she would be able to tell if the child had a “predisposing condition such as a neurological disorder that may have prevented him
from getting out of the bathtub.”9
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial
court erred in allowing the testimony of the pediatrician. 10 The defendant contended that the admission of the pediatrician‟s testimony
regarding the child‟s statement violated his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confrontation.11 The claimant based his argument on
Crawford v. Washington12 and Davis v. Washington,13 where the
United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who
[does] not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”14
The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected the plaintiff‟s argument, concluding that the defendant‟s rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated because the child‟s statement “was not
of a testimonial character.”15 The court stated that the child‟s response did not constitute testimony because the “primary purpose” of
the doctor‟s question was to enable her to provide proper medical
treatment for the child‟s injuries.16 Although New York does not
have its own code of evidence, there is a “recognized exception to the
rule against hearsay” that allows for this kind of statement to be admitted into evidence.17 In both federal and New York law, an out-of
8

Id.
Id. at 618-19.
10
Id. at 618. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court. Duhs, 947
N.E.2d at 618.
11
Id. 619.
12
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
13
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
14
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 619-20.
17
HON. LEE H ELKINS, JANE FOSBINDER & MELISSA BREGER, N.Y. LAW OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE §1:112 (2010) (“A person‟s out-of-court statement about his or her then existing
physical condition, made to a treating physician or other medical professional, for the purpose of obtaining medical care, is admissible under a recognized exception to the rule
against hearsay.”).
9
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court statement to a physician or other medical professional, made for
the purpose of attaining medical treatment, is admissible in court.18
II.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENCE

In Duhs, the New York Court of Appeals started its Confrontation Clause analysis with Crawford,19 decided in 2004. The Court
in Crawford looked to the Sixth Amendment‟s Confrontation Clause,
which provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him.”20
According to Crawford, a “witness” against the accused is one who
“bear[s] testimony.”21 “Testimony,” according to the Court, is a “solemn declaration or affirmation” that is made to establish or prove a
fact.22 The Court explained that a formal statement to a government
official would constitute testimony, whereas a casual remark to a
friend would not.23 Therefore, the Court held that tape-recorded
statements between the petitioner‟s wife and the police were testimonial, and thus the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to
cross-examination.24 At a minimum, the court stated that “testimony”
refers to “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations,” but left a more
“comprehensive definition” for another time.25
That time came in 2006 in Davis,26 where the Court established an “ongoing emergency” guideline to clear up the difference
between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.27 For instance,
the Court explained that during police interrogations, statements are
non-testimonial when circumstances objectively indicate that the
“primary purpose” of the exchange is “to meet an ongoing emergen18

FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 408.
20
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
22
Id. (quoting WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
23
Id. In Crawford, the State allowed testimonial statements to be admitted against the
petitioner, without allowing the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id.
at 68. The Supreme Court held that this was in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id.
24
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The statements were regarding the stabbing of a man named
Kenneth Lee. Id. at 38-39.
25
Id. at 68.
26
See generally Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (decided on June 19, 2006).
27
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
19
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cy.”28 Statements made under circumstances that objectively indicate
no ongoing emergency, where the primary purpose of an interrogation is “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution” are testimonial in nature.29 In Davis, the Court
came to the conclusion that there was an ongoing emergency by
viewing the situation objectively30 and interpreted statements made
during a 911 call as non-testimonial, because they were describing
“current circumstances” that required “police assistance.”31 The
Court stated that the declarant “was not acting as a witness” and was
not testifying, but was telling a 911 operator the details of a domestic
disturbance in real time as the events unfolded.32 According to the
Court, the declarant‟s statements were not “a weaker substitute for
live testimony.”33
The Davis decision came with a companion case, Hammon v.
Indiana,34 where circumstances showed, from an objective viewpoint,
that the interrogation in question was part of a criminal investigation.35 The Court stated that the interrogation in Hammon was similar to that of Crawford, as in both instances the declarant was “actively separated from the defendant,” spoke of past criminal activity, and
spoke to police well after the events in question took place.36 According to the Court, this situation was one of “official interrogation,”
which constitutes a “substitute for live testimony” and is thus “inherently testimonial.”37 The declarant in this situation acted in the same
manner as a witness on direct examination at a trial.38 For instance,
there was no imminent threat to the declarant, and police questioned
her to investigate a possible crime, not to assess an emergency in
progress.39 The statements made recounted how past events began
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id. at 828. The Court stated that Michelle McCottry‟s phone call to 911 was “plainly a
call for help against bona fide physical threat.” Id. at 827.
31
Davis, 547 U.S. at 814. See id. at 817-818 (stating “[h]e‟s here jumpin‟ on me again”
and “he‟s usin‟ his fists” in addition to telling the operator her former boyfriend‟s name).
32
Id. at 814.
33
Id. at 828 (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)).
34
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
35
Id. at 830.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830.
29
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and progressed, which is exactly “what a witness does on direct examination.”40 The Supreme Court in Hammon focused on how formal this interrogation was, as well as the time lapse between the
event in question and the time of statements.41
III.

LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

Lower courts were left to fill in the blanks from the Crawford
and Davis decisions. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Tolliver42 held that a “crucial aspect of Crawford is that it only covers hearsay, [or] out-of-court statements[,]” which, according to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, are statements “offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.”43 The court acknowledged that “while
Crawford did not firmly define” testimony, Davis indicated that it
“pertains to statements that a declarant makes in anticipation of . . .
criminal prosecution.”44 In Tolliver, the court found not only that the
statements in question were not hearsay, but also that they were not
testimonial because the declarant was making “candid, real-time
comments” to a government informant about a drug deal that was in
progress.45 The comments were “not [a] recounting of past events.46
In United States v. Saget,47 the Second Circuit had to decide
whether an individual constituted a “„witness‟ who bears testimony”
under the Confrontation Clause, when that individual did not know
his statements were being used by police and eventually at trial.48
According to Saget, Crawford advises that the determining factor in
whether a declarant is a witness who bears testimony “is the declarant‟s awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later
be used at a trial.”49 This is determined by examining what a decla-

40

Id.
Id.
42
454 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2006).
43
Id. at 666 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801) (stating that hearsay “is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted”).
44
Tolliver, 454 F.3d at 665.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
48
Id. at 228.
49
Id.
41
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rant would “reasonably” have believed at that time.50
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the assessment of the 911
calls in Davis in United States v. Arnold.51 The court in Arnold stated
that there might be a gray area as to what is testimonial and what is
not when it comes to 911 calls and “on-the-scene statements.”52 The
court stressed the importance of assessing a victim‟s statement “in its
own context” in order to decide whether the statements are testimonial or not.53 According to Arnold, such “boundary disputes will continue to emerge.”54 In Arnold, the court ultimately found that the victim‟s statements were non-testimonial,55 because they were prompted
by an ongoing emergency, and not interrogation by police officers.56
The Sixth Circuit stressed the importance analyzing the individual‟s
statements within the circumstances of the case.57
IV.

MICHIGAN V. BRYANT EXPANSION

The decisions in Crawford and Davis have served as the starting point for Confrontation Clause analysis, but they may be dying
off. The Supreme Court further expanded its view on Confrontation
Clause analysis in Michigan v. Bryant.58 Here, it stated that the Confrontation Clause is most concerned with restricting the use of “outof-court statements” by a witness when involved in an “out-of-court”
interrogation by a state actor.59 The Court stated that the Confrontation Clause seeks to ensure that an accused receives the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness about the statements that were used for
trial.60 According to Bryant, the “ongoing emergency” guideline in
Davis forces a court to see if the primary purpose of an interrogation

50

Id. at 229.
486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007).
52
Id. at 189.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 192.
56
Arnold, 486 F.3d at 191. In Arnold, Tamica Gordon approached police officers crying
and explained that defendant Joseph Arnold pulled out a gun and was trying to kill her. Id.
at 180.
57
Id. at 189.
58
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
59
Id. at 1155.
60
Id.
51
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is to “create a record for trial” or to respond to an emergency. 61 If
the situation genuinely involved an ongoing emergency, it falls outside the “scope of the Clause.”62
In Bryant, the Court held that the interaction between a mortally wounded man and the police served the purpose of resolving an
active emergency situation, and therefore the statements made were
non-testimonial.63 The Court in Bryant also stated that “there may be
other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-ofcourt substitute for trial testimony.”64 Therefore, when a court finds
that a statement is non-testimonial, the statement would possibly be
excluded from a trial through the rules of hearsay, and not through
the Confrontation Clause.65
The Bryant case further explained the “ongoing emergency”
situation as described in Davis.66 The Court stressed that “an objective analysis of the circumstances” is necessary in assessing the primary purpose of an encounter, including the “statements and actions
of the parties” involved.67 According to Bryant, the purpose of the
encounter must be viewed from the perspective of a “reasonable participant.”68 The Court stated that “implicit in Davis is the idea” that
statements are less likely to be fabricated when participants are actively resolving an emergency.69 The Court in Bryant compared this
logic to the justification for the “excited utterance exception in hear61

Id.
Id.
63
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. The statements here involved the identification and description of the defendant Richard Bryant. Compare id. at 1150 (holding that a wounded man‟s
statements to police were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the statements were
to receive police assistance), with Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830 (holding that a woman‟s statements to police in investigating a possible crime were testimonial because the statements
were “deliberately recounted” and “in response to police question” a significant amount of
time after the event described was over), and Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-28 (holding that statements made by a declarant during a 911 call were not testimonial because the statements
were necessary to resolve a physical threat that was ongoing).
64
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
65
Id. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). See also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008)
(stating that “statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded [from trial], if at all, only by hearsay rules” and not by the Confrontation Clause).
66
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1157.
62
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say law,”70 where there is no time for the declarant to fabricate because he or she is under the stress of an active situation.71 Additionally, the Court noted that the Davis decision did not consider the implications of medical emergencies.72 In Bryant, the Court explained
that the medical condition of the victim is pertinent in analyzing his
or her purpose in speaking with first responders.73 For example, a
victim could be so debilitated that he or she may not “understand
whether [his or] her statements are for the purpose of addressing an
ongoing emergency or for the purpose of” use at a later trial.74 According to the Court, this is still to be viewed objectively from the
viewpoint of a “reasonable victim” because it focuses on the understanding of the victim while in the victim‟s actual state.75
Analyzing the facts in Duhs, using the Bryant decision, one
can come to the objective conclusion that the main purpose of the
child‟s conversation with the pediatrician was to treat the injuries.
One could even argue that the child and the physician were actively
resolving an emergency during the time that the child was being
questioned by the doctor, and thus, that the statements made by the
child were comparable to an excited utterance.76 In Duhs, the court
held that the statements made by the child to his physician in the
course of medical treatment were non-testimonial, and thus fell outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.77 The court stated that
since the statements were for the purpose of medical diagnosis and
treatment, they were “admitted under that exception to the hearsay
rule.”78
70
Id. Pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 803(2), an excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.” FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
71
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157.
72
Id. at 1159. Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150 (explaining that victim Anthony Covington was found by police with a gunshot wound to his abdomen), with Davis, 547 U.S. at
817 (“Michelle McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend.”).
73
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159.
74
Id. at 1161.
75
Id. at 1161-62. “The inquiry is still objective because it focuses on the understanding
and purpose of a reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim – circumstances
that prominently include the victim‟s physical state.” Id.
76
See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (defining excited utterance).
77
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619.
78
Id. at 618 (quoting Davidson v. Cornell, 30 N.E. 573, 576 (N.Y. 1892)) (“[T]here is a
strong inducement for the patient to speak truly of his pains and sufferings,” therefore,
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NEW YORK DECISIONS

In addition to discussing federal cases, the court in Duhs
looked to its own cases in reaching its decision. In People v. Rawlins,79 the Court of Appeals stated that the question of whether statements are considered testimonial or non-testimonial “requires consideration of multiple factors not all of equal import in every case.”80
According to the court in Rawlins, the two most important factors include whether the statement was made in a manner that resembles an
out-of-court examination, and whether the statement accused the defendant of criminal activity.81 To find out whether these factors were
fulfilled, the court formulated a test where a court must look to “the
purpose of making . . . the statement, and the declarant‟s motive” for
making the statement.82
There is long-standing precedent in New York that statements
made to a physician in the course of medical treatment are admissible
in court.83 In Duhs, the court cited to its decision in Davidson v.
Cornell,84 where it stated that statements to a physician “have quite
uniformly been held admissible.”85 However, the statements must relate to a present condition, injury, or disease.86 According to Davidson, statements made to a physician only serve as admissible evidence when the statements were made in the course of examination
for the treatment of a present ailment.87 The decision in Davidson
was at the heart of the court‟s holding in Duhs.
Similar to the physician‟s questioning of the child in Duhs, a
police officer in People v. Bradley88 questioned an injured woman in

“statements expressive of [a patient‟s] present condition are permitted to be given as evidence only when made to a physician for the purposes of treatment.”).
79
884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008).
80
Id. at 1033.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See ELKINS, FOSBINDER & BREGER, supra note 17 (“The basis for admissibility is the
notion that the person‟s self-interest in receiving appropriate medical care ensures that the
declarant will give accurate information to the medical professional.”).
84
30 N.E. 573 (N.Y. 1892).
85
Id. at 576.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
862 N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 2006).
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order to decide what action to take immediately.89 The New York
Court of Appeals in Bradley “accept[ed] the holdings of Crawford
and Davis as the basis for [its] decision under both [the federal and
state] constitutions.”90 The court found that the interaction precipitated by the officer “was a normal and appropriate way to begin”
dealing with the emergency and stated that any reasonable police officer would have acted in a similar manner.91 In this instance, the
court found that the woman‟s statements were not testimonial under
Crawford and Davis, as she was giving information to an officer who
was questioning her during a present emergency.92 Therefore, the defendant‟s rights were not violated under the Confrontation Clause. 93
In 2007, the New York Court of Appeals beat the Supreme
Court to the chase by deciding, prior to Bryant, that the Davis decision should be interpreted broadly. In People v. Nieves-Andino,94 the
Court of Appeals recognized that Davis did not impose “a restricted
interpretation of what constitutes a continuing emergency.”95 The
court looked at the “ongoing emergency” guideline in a broader
sense, stating that a first responder may reasonably assume that there
is an ongoing emergency to be dealt with, even if the danger has
passed.96 The responder‟s questioning may “objectively indicate”
that his or her primary purpose was to prevent further harm from taking place.97 For example, in Nieves-Andino, police found the victim
bleeding from a gunshot wound and asked the victim to explain what
happened in order to assess the danger of the situation.98
The Nieves-Andino decision can be applied to Duhs.99 For

89

Id. at 81.
Id. at 80.
91
Id. at 81.
92
Id.
93
Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 79.
94
872 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 2007).
95
Id. at 1190.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1188-89.
99
However, it is important to point out that in the majority of cases discussed, law enforcement, such as police officers, were the first responders that were questioning the victims in the emergency situations. In Duhs, the situation was quite different, as the statements
made by the declarant were in response to a physician during the course of immediate medical treatment. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 620-21. According to Giles, statements made to physicians do not even fall under the reach of the Confrontation Clause. Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
90
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example, it could be argued that the active emergency in Duhs had
passed in the time between the child‟s injury and the child‟s arrival at
the hospital.100 However, just as police question to resolve an emergency, doctors must question patients about their injuries in order to
figure out how to treat them. Thus, one can see that the interaction
between the child and the doctor in Duhs was for the purpose of
“render[ing] a diagnosis and administer[ing] medical treatment”101
within the broad sense of an ongoing emergency described in NievesAndino.102
Bradley and Nieves-Andino emphasized the purpose of the
first responder‟s questioning, rather than the declarant‟s answers, to
determine whether a declarant‟s statement was testimonial or nontestimonial.103 However, Rawlins, the court‟s most current decision
in this area, indicated that a court must focus on the statements of all
parties involved.104 This is a broader approach, which was adopted
by the Supreme Court in Bryant.105 In Rawlins, the court placed more
emphasis on the motive behind the victim‟s responses, rather than the
motives behind the first responder‟s questioning.106 In Duhs, the
court focused more on the purpose of the doctor‟s inquiry than the
purpose of the child‟s statement,107 but, nonetheless, cited to the
broad interpretation of an “ongoing emergency” from Bryant.108 The
court sought guidance from Bryant, rather than Crawford and Davis,
which were relied on unsuccessfully by the defendant.109 The court
in Duhs also stressed the importance of the standard rules of hearsay
Likewise, in Davidson, the New York Court of Appeals held that statements made by an individual to a doctor regarding his or her suffering are admissible statements. Davidson, 30
N.E. at 576.
100
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 618 (discussing the time line of events, specifically, that the
child‟s mother came home five hours after the child was injured and, at that point, took him
to the hospital).
101
Id. at 620.
102
Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d at 1190.
103
Id.; Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 81.
104
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
105
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156; see People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div.
1st Dep‟t 2005) (taking a position that was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in
Davis in 2006). In Coleman, the court held that the conveyance of information to a 911 dispatcher was not “structured questioning” and thus, did not render a testimonial response. Id.
106
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
107
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619-20.
108
Id. at 619.
109
Id.
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in making its determination because there may be circumstances other than ongoing emergencies where statements are not a substitute for
live testimony.110 The rules of hearsay weighed heavily in the court‟s
decision because of the long-standing tradition that statements made
in the course of medical treatment are admissible in court.111
VI.

POST-DUHS

Ten months after Duhs, the Appellate Division, First Department decided People v. Shaw,112 which dealt with statements made to
both a police officer and a physician.113 Here the court found that the
defendant‟s right of confrontation was not violated because neither
statement constituted testimony.114 The court held that the primary
purpose of the victim‟s statement to a responding police officer was
to enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency because there
was an armed suspect in the vicinity.115 Additionally, the police
needed to learn what happened “to determine whether the victim required prompt medical assistance.”116 The second statement at issue
in this case “was made to a gynecologist” who was treating the victim
at the hospital.117 The court found that the statement made to the doctor was non-testimonial, by looking to the Duhs decision, because
“the doctor acted primarily as a treating physician.”118
Like Giles and Davidson, this decision takes the view that
“the right of confrontation is not absolute,”119 because of the admissibility of statements for purposes of medical treatment120 and other

110

Id.
Davidson, 30 N.E. at 576.
112
914 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2011). The defendant in this case was
convicted of rape and burglary, both in the first degree. Id. at 156. The judgment of the trial
court, “sentencing him . . . to consecutive terms of twelve and a half to twenty-five years and
three and a half to seven years [was] unanimously affirmed.” Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Shaw, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
33 N.Y. JUR. 2D Criminal Law: Procedure § 2094 (2011) (citing In re German F., 821
N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (Fam. Ct. 2006)).
120
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
111
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well-established hearsay exceptions, such as excited utterances.121
While not at issue in Shaw, a court could potentially find that a
statement made by a declarant to the police at a crime scene constitutes an excited utterance.122 Likewise, a court could also find that a
telephone conversation with a 911 dispatcher falls under this exception.123
VII.

CONCLUSION

Prior to Bryant, courts were left to expand upon Davis as they
saw fit. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals has put more
emphasis on the questions of first responders rather than the answers
of declarants in deciding if statements are testimonial.124 In Duhs, the
court may have chosen to analyze the circumstances this way because
the declarant was a three-year-old child, so he may not have had any
reason for his statements other than his own physical well being in
mind. The court analyzed the primary purpose of the physician‟s
question, holding that it was a medical inquiry during the course of
treatment.125 Therefore, the court found that the child‟s statement
was properly admitted under the hearsay exception for statements
made in the course of medical treatment.126
The Duhs decision has already been cited,127 and is likely to
serve precedential value for other cases that involve statements made
to medical professionals. The Duhs decision should be enough to
dispose of claims by a defendant that his or her constitutional right to
confrontation has been violated by the admission of patient testimony. However, courts may continuously be faced with the issue of
what is testimonial and what is not in cases where a declarant has
spoken to police. By broadening the “ongoing emergency” guideline
from Davis, the Court in Bryant has rendered the Crawford decision
useless. Future courts will utilize this broader view to guide their
121

FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
See id. (stating that excited utterances are statements made while under the stress of an
event).
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Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d at 1190; Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 81.
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Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619-20.
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Id. at 618. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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See Shaw, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (citing Duhs to support its holding that the victim‟s
statement to the gynecologist was not testimonial).
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analysis, but the question of what exactly constitutes testimony will
not always be clear. Courts will be forced to resolve this question on
a case-by-case basis.
Caroline Knoepffler*

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Thank you to
the talented members of the Touro Law Review, especially Michael Newman, for assisting
me with this paper. Thanks to Professor Jeffrey Morris for his guidance and advice. Special
thanks to my family, particularly Mom, Dad, Kiel, and Kate, for their unwavering love and
support, and to Mommom, for encouraging me to fulfill my educational goals. Finally,
thank you to Brittany for the inspiration.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/30

14

